Barbier, E.B. (2000), “Biodiversity, trade and international agreements,” Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000005310 Winands, S., Holm-Muller, K., Weikard, H.-P. (2013). The game of biodiversity protection with heterogeneous countries. Ecological economy, 89, 14-23. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.01.013. The Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species for Wildlife in 1979 and 1994 was signed in the United Kingdom in 1979 and requires the protection of the reserve classified as a historical monument and advocates separate international agreements on these and other threatened species. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species in 1973 (CITES) regulates international trade in wildlife through a system of permits and certificates. CITES came into force in 1975 and currently has more than 150 contracting parties. The United Kingdom became a party to the Convention in 1976 and the European Union, although not a party to the Convention, fully implemented it through a number of Council and Commission decisions.
For more information, visit The European Community and Trade in Wild FAUNA AND FLORA and CITES UK. Elmqvist, T. (2012). Cities and biodiversity – action and politics. Montreal: UN secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Asymmetry between countries has been studied in the IEA literature. The adoption of symmetrical countries was relaxed by McGinty (2007), which illustrates, through simulation exercises, that IEAs can make significant profits with asymmetric countries under an appropriate transfer system. Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013) and Finus and McGinty (2015) are studying a model of bilateral asymmetry in which countries differ in both emissions benefits and environmental damage. They conclude that large coalitions can be stable under bilateral asymmetry, even if there is no transmission, but only if the asymmetries are sufficiently large. In addition, large asymmetry coalitions perform better when transmissions are permitted than in symmetrical cases. Winands et al.
(2013) focuses on the role of asymmetries in the stability of biodiversity conservation agreements. Their numerical study shows that in the absence of transfers, asymmetries between states in terms of ecosystems and prosperity reduce the size of a stable coalition compared to a symmetrical model specification. On the other hand, the inclusion of an optimal transfer scheme for the asymmetrical case stabilizes a grand coalition in a game of four players.